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The Partnership for Peace is the anteroom to
NATO membership. As the document issued by the
heads of state and government of NATO's member
nations in 1994 put it: "Active participation in the Part-
nership for Peace will play an important role in the
evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO." Four
years later, three countries are on the threshold of mov-
ing from PFP to full NATO membership. This is a path
the United States hopes other countries will follow -
including Croatia.
But NATO membership is not automatic for PFP
members. NATO, after all, in a community of like-
minded nations. All share a commitment to the same
fundamental democratic principles. As the North At-
lantic Treaty, which established NATO on April 3,
1949, says: "The parties ... are determined to safeguard
the freedom, common heritage and civilization oftheir
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, indi-
vidual liberty, and the rule of law." Although I have
been here only four months, it has been long enough
to know that the people of Croatia share this heritage
and this commitment to the principles of democracy,
individual liberty, and the rule of law. This is, in fact,
what makes Croatia a prime candidate for inclusion in
the western community of democratic nations.
We also recognize that, unlike some of those
countries now entering NATO, Croatia has had to make
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the transition from decades of authoritarian rule to
market capitalism under the most trying circumstances,
while simultaneously fighting for its survival and free-
dom as an independent state. We know this was not
easy. We can sympathize. Our country, too, was born
in war, and 222 years later we are still struggling to
reach the goal enunciated in the first sentence of our
constitution - "to form a more perfect union."
This is, in fact, why we have presented the Gov-
ernment of Croatia with this roadmap. Our roadmap is
not long or complicated. Its terms are clear and simple.
When they are met, Croatia will have our full support
for entry into Partnership for Peace. If they are met,
Croatia will also strengthen both its international repu-
tation and its own democratic system.
To briefly sum up: the United States Govern-
ment firmly believes that it is in our best interest and
your best interest that Croatia base its future security
policy on PFP and NATO. We want to assist you in
joining PFP as quickly as possible and have presented
a roadmap to your government to help it to do so. We
hope you can complete all the benchmarks by the end
of 1998. The timetable, however, is up to you. Noth-
ing would give me more pleasure, however, than see-
ing Croatia achieve this historic step forward in time
for the ChristmaslNew Year holidays. Wewill help you
in any way we can. •
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When the socialist system in Europe collapsed,
the bipolar model in international relations vanished,
and a new phase was started, of a search for struc-
tures and models of international relationships. But
just as one-time attempts to introduce the concepts
of trilateralism or pentagonalism did not change the
bipolar relations of the two super powers, so today's
discussions that endeavour to create an image of a
model of the new world order on the so-called for-
mula of "one super power and four great powers" or
"one super power and several great powers" are still
far from the reality. Thus the claim that the world
order has been established and that a new model can
be discussed within the framework of the existent
structure of the distribution of power has come more
and more to dominate, especially in America. Its
view is that it is easy to see that there is only one
super power and that the world order is subordinated
to it, this structure of relationships not being likely
to change in a generation. This implies that multi-
polarity, seen in this way, means primarily that there
is a central and large pole, the United States, while
the other parts, the four great powers, China, Rus-
sia, the EU and Japan, or the several great powers,
are unable to fulfil the tasks of leadership, of the
central pole that is.
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The character of American power, concen-
trated round economic development, military force,
science and foreign policy engagement, shows that
only America is in a state to pose and realise global
strategic aims. However, even all those American
authors who accept such a definition of American
power and the role of American global strategy nev-
ertheless agree that the US cannot act everywhere
and deal with every problem, and that to a great ex-
tent it has to take into account the interests and views
of the four other great powers.
If one were to analyse further this kind of
model of the world order that, with all its endeavours
to talk about multipolarity, nevertheless has a ten-
dency towards unilateralness, a division within the
four great powers can be made. It is clear, for ex-
ample, that Europe, or, German policy in Europe, as
it is sometimes referred to, has the same economic
and political foundations as the USA. Then there
are the numerous political, economic and security
threads that bind Europe and the US, and Europe,
that important player, is in practical terms a part of
the joint Atlantic strategic projection. This goes even
more for Japan, which in spite of its enormous eco-
nomic strength, follows the American line completely
in security and political affairs. If to the total power
of America we add on the EU and Japan, it follows
that the new world order does have powerful lead-
ers, irrespective of how the internal relations between
the USA and the other two figures are arranged. In a
strategic sense, the interests of the central pole of
the world order and its two biggest allies are identi-
cal, and a firm leadership can be built upon them.
China as future global colossus
Two of the four world powers with which the
centre of the world order should be built have in fact
a somewhat different view of it. Mainland China
and Russia, although in completely different condi-
tions, look upon the new world order as a set of val-
ues and relations that do not satisfy their interests
completely and, irrespective of their being ranked
among the four great powers, they are not sure that
they are going to get any very prominent position at
the top of this order.
China, with its accelerating economic growth
and relatively stable internal situation is in a posi-
tion to make use of all its advantages as a great coun-
try. Enormous investments in the economy from the
West, and modem equipment, are beginning to give
results, and according to numerous analyses, in
twenty years China should be a very powerful coun-
try. This, of course, poses the Chinese leadership
with the question of China at the summit of interna-
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
tional relations. Current Chinese positions can be
presented most easily as a part of the activity of a
regional Asian power, which can achieve its regional
aims with its existing means.
Placing the stress on the need to build up a
multipolarity in the world order, Chinese politics
looks for assistance to the OECD May 1997 analy-
sis that says that in 2020 five states, Brazil, China,
India, Russia and Indonesia, will account for one third
of total world production, while the developing coun-
tries will also raise the value of their production up
to one third. Developed countries would reduce their
share of world production to one third.
Taking it as a fact that in this total new distri-
bution the relative power of the US will fall, Chi-
nese theorists claim that even today, American poli-
tics is having problems with some countries of
ASEAN or Latin America, and this is the beginning
of the changes.
All this together is supposed to confmn the idea
that the world of the future will not have many simi-
larities with the past phases of development of inter-
national relations when there was quite clearly the
domination of just a few great powers. In the new
complex of total global development, particularly of
the developing countries, in China it is said that it is
possible to expect the origin and action of a series of
new global and regional powers, as of groups oflarge
countries, which will have a significant role in inter-
national relations and in the new world order.
The approach that stresses the current great
backwardness ofthe developing countries, their lack
of unity and their lack of decisiveness in the estab-
lishment of any joint interests is considered by Chi-
nese theorists to be related to a passing phenomenon.
Thus the whole construction of the current world
order, set up at the level of a central pole and four
great powers, is taken as a transitory solution that
will not manage to remain for very long and not as a
model that will manage to last out even the genera-
tion.
In the current situation China particularly re-
sents American political hegemonism and politics
from the positions of a force that is particularly evi-
dent in the neighbourhood of China. The USA has
100,000 troops located in Asia and the Pacific, as-
sisting the overall augmentation of military force with
their thesis that the Asian-Pacific region is turbulent
and unstable. Japan, with its military budget of$55.4
billion is the number two state in terms of military
expenditure. Then there are the special relationship
between Japan and America and the development of
American-Australian military co-operation. Chinese
analysts condemn American interpretations of Chi-
nese accelerated growth and alleged strengthening
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of military power, which are supposed to show that
China will become the number one world power. In
Beijing they look at this as the search for a new ad-
versary, the presentation of China as a future threat
serving American domestic needs.
In order to parry the current situation, Chi-
nese politics is active at several levels:
- globally, it rejects the idea of a world order based
on hegemony,
- it is attempting to develop relations with certain
Asian countries that share this way of thinking,
- it is hard at work developing co-operation with
Russia which is also an important economic partner,
likely to be more so in the future,
- it is endeavouring to promote its ideas about a mul-
tipolar world among the numerous countries of the
third world, said to be an important player in future
international relations.
Occupied with its own internal problems of
development, China is able with this kind of policy
to be involved at the international level and at the
same time to appear as a champion of new relations
and a new order. It thus defines its standpoint about
current international relations and about those that
will appear in the future, when China will certainly
be stronger.
However, it is clear that when China does be-
come stronger, there will be new relations with the
world, in which China will project its own view of
the world and the world order. With the need to solve
the Macao problem, which will come very soon, there
is also the problem of Taiwan, which is still a chal-
lenge to the image of China as great power. Then
there are also the questions of the delicate relations
with India, with Vietnam and in particular with Ja-
pan, all of which weigh heavy on its image as a great
country. At the same time the very complex Chinese
relations with the US, an important business partner
and at the same time a country that is firmly linked
with Japan, as well as a country from which come
criticisms of Chinese human rights policies, are also
a burden on Chinese policy.
Bearing all this in mind, in recent years China
has been hard at work developing relations with
Russia, relations currently characterised as a strate-
gic partnership. Solutions to border problems, an
agreement about the redeployment of nuclear weap-
ons, the development of considerable trading links
and military co-operation have certainly created
model relations between these two great powers,
which have, at the same time, similar views about
questions of the new world order. Although in total
economic power China has now outstripped Russia,
it sees in the great country to the west an important
and useful ally it is linked to by a number of inter-
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ests, bilateral and of a wider international nature. In
this current, very likely optimum phase of bilateral
relations, China is interested in having Russia as ally
in Asian matters and on the wider global level. In a
pluralist world, which for Chinese analysts is a syn-
onym for the current situation in which there is uni-
lateral American leadership, it is impossible to win
a place for yourself independently, and the alliance
with Russia is highly necessary. Although in China
there are various schools of thought about Russia
(some of them thinking it a weak and played-out
country, while others stress that in twenty or thirty
years Russia will once again become a great power
thanks to its qualified personnel and great natural
resources), Chinese policy does not miss any chance
to build up relations that suit both sides.
The Russians support China and its
endeavours to solve the Taiwan question, while on
the other hand Chinese policy has supported Rus-
sian critiques of NATO expansion, while China and
Russia both oppose America getting into Central Asia
and its insistence on the strengthening of pluralism
as the main base from which to prevent a resurgence
of the USSR.
But ifit can be said of China that it is a power
with the ability to act regionally, on an upward devel-
opment path, nevertheless it would be hard to imag-
ine China being a central pole of the new world order.
Even in the phase in which China becomes the world's
strongest state, it will still have enormous problems.
In the first place, this is a very populous country where,
irrespective of the tempo of growth over the next
twenty years, a great part of the population will live at
a low level. This will create difficulties in social divi-
sions, between different structures in society, and
among the individual parts of China. From a techno-
logical point of view, Chinese development is largely
dependent on Western expertise and loans, which
means that in every situation it will be possible to
control the direction of Chinese movement. Finally,
the current social and political stability is still based
on a firm socialist political model and an economic
mixture of capitalist and socialist principles. Looked
at over the long haul, it is a question how long this
monocentric political model will be able to resist plu-
ralist pressures that will come from a more developed
economic tempo of dynamic growth and from con-
nections with the rest of the world. Then there is the
question of human rights and democracy, which if they
have not yet developed to any great extent are at least
knocking on the door. All this together can limit China
in its endeavours to take a leading place in world rela-
tionships or to become the central pole of the world
order.
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Russian accommodation to realities
In the early Yeltsin foreign policy phase, when
it was believed it would be possible to built a strate-
gic partnership between the US and Russia, the
weight of Russian policy was placed in that direc-
tion, with the obvious hope that it would be possible
to create a condominium of Russian and American
interests. This quite simply would have resulted in
a solution to the problem of the world order and
Russia's leading place in it. However, very soon,
hopes in some strategic partnership began to weaken,
Russian foreign policy sobering up when it had to
face real problems. The USA with its practical ap-
proaches clearly showed that it considered Russia a
great power, but that it was now weak in every point
of view and that of the characteristics of a great power
only nuclear weapons were left to it. There was no
chance of any kind of Russo-American condominium
or the creation of a special relationship in which the
Russians would have some kind of vote identical to
that of the Americans. All those in Russia who had
expected such a development had to search for dif-
ferent political conceptions.
In the framework of its understanding of the
new relations, American policy:
- proposed the thesis that geo-strategic polycentrism
in the area of the former USSR was useful and de-
sirable,
- said that it was necessary to develop relations with
the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, so as to
enable the penetration of American interests into the
Ukraine and former Soviet Central Asia,
- affirmed that Russia could have nothing to say about
the expansion of NATO,
- took the view that world crises could be (Bosnia)
but did not have to be (Iraq) solved on the basis of
common viewpoints between Russia and America,
- held that Russia was too weak and for this reason
could not be treated as an equal partner.
Russian policy, realising the new realities, in
which the group of the so-called Westerners was
defeated, sought new space for action. Instead of
arguing for partnership or mature partnership with
the US, for which Russia quite obviously does not
have the means either today or in the near future,
Russian policy was redirected towards:
- closer foreign countries,
- China,
- the countries of Western Europe.
In its approach to closer foreign countries,
Russian foreign policy also made a great about-turn.
Convinced at the beginning that almost all the former
Soviet republics, in spite of their independence,
would soon be looking to Moscow as the centre of
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economic, industrial and social and cultural devel-
opment, Russian policy was primarily directed to-
wards the development of Russo-American ties.
Only when it was seen that these relationships were
not producing the desired results and that at the same
time the states of the CIS were getting further and
further away from the Commonwealth and increas-
ingly stressing their independence did Russian for-
eign policy make a U-turn and start treating this area
as of primary interest.
In the document Strategic Principles of Russia
(1995) about relations with the countries of the CIS,
economic integration was stressed as the aim. This
was to be achieved via the creation of customs and
payments unions, a joint space for scientific and tech-
nological collaboration, the transfer of capital and so
on. The stress placed upon the idea that the co-opera-
tion proposed would be the voluntary activity of sov-
ereign and equal states was aimed at bringing all the
countries of the CIS into the tie-strengthening pro-
cess. However, it was clear that inside the Common-
wealth a split had already occurred. Russia, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan were for such co-opera-
tion; the Caucasus countries showed less interest, and
the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan almost.none
at all. All these three countries were bombarded with
American, Turkish and Iranian offers of co-operation.
Petroleum reserves in Central Asia exceed those of
the North Sea, Kuwait and Mexico put together, and
the great oil companies are increasingly active. The
first pipeline from Azerbaijan that does not cross over
Russian territory is being built, in an endeavour to
avoid both dependence on Russian space and Russian
pressures. In the Asian republics the first railway lines
that link Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan with Iran have
been built, which has also reduced their dependence
on Moscow.
The centrifugal forces that are at work in the
Commonwealth are the result of bad experience from
the past and fears of Russian domination. Since the
doors are increasingly wide open for co-operation with
the US, Iran, Saudi, Turkey and Pakistan, Russian
desires to step up collaboration within the CIS are
meeting with less and less interest. In spite of this, it
is obvious that Russian policy will, because of past
relationships, because of the great number of Russians
in these countries, go on with connections that exist
and with attempts to parry foreign activity through
championing and strengthening collaboration in the
CIS. If this were successful, Russian policy would be
stronger internally, and would have an important card
to play in its relations with the US.
Relations with China are developing in line with
the Russian intention of creating good and friendly
relations with its neighbours. As the Russian side says
t
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today, the two countries can be good neighbours, good
friends, and good partners. Because of this intention,
border problems have been solved, and both sides at-
tempt to resist any statements that present the other
country as a danger or a threat. Although in Russia
there is still a viewpoint that says in the future China
could be the greatest threat to Russian interests, nev-
ertheless the prevailing view is that co-operation with
China is in the interests of Russia, and that in this
positions can be created for some new place for Rus-
sia at the centre of the world order.
Economic complementarity, and the rapid
growth in Chinese productivity, have created oppor-
tunities for the development of trade which is particu-
larly significant in the border areas of both countries.
At the same time, Siberia and the Russian Far East
have rich resources that are necessary for Chinese in-
dustry. Via APEC and bilateral relations, China helps
in the development of these parts of Russia, thus ex-
panding overall economic and trade relations.
Instead of the one-time relations based on the
same Marxist-Leninist ideology, today's Sino-Russian
relations are developing on the pragmatic interests and
needs of the two countries. They understand the value
of these relations, both because of internal reasons
and for the sake of their international positions. In
both cases, it is considered that co-operation can help
in the furthering of their international roles.
Russian policy says that it wants to build joint
relations with China on the base of equality and re-
spect for sovereign interests, and that in their actions
both countries can stand up for a more just and demo-
cratic world. Multipolarity is for both countries the
foundation of the new post-cold war relations. Faced
with events in Eastern Europe, where NATO is on
the point of taking in new countries, and with activi-
ties in Central Asia, Russian policy claims that it
cannot allow, in the new circumstances, the cold war
line to be replaced by some new line of division
among countries. In the new conditions there should
not be any leading countries, or states that are led,
and that all tendencies leading to a unipolar world
are impermissible. To this, China adds the need to
construct relations in the new world order on five
principles, of peace-loving coexistence, and the de-
mand for hegemony and the politics of force to be
replaced by respect for the sovereign rights of all
states, irrespective of their size, strength or position.
Community of interests is best expressed in
views about the solution of regional conflicts and
crises. In the whole run of political, economic, terri-
torial, national and ethnic conflicts and local wars,
both sides see a danger to security. This is particu-
larly strongly marked in Russia, which is faced with
numerous crises in the ex-USSR some of which can
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easily spill over onto its territory (Chechnia). At the
international level Russian and Chinese politics of
crisis from the Near East, in ex-Yugoslavia, Africa,
South East Asia always look for the use of peaceful
solutions, the initiation of dialogue, negotiations and
consultations. They are against the use of the mecha-
nisms of regional organisations and in the event of
the action of the UN seek full control of the opera-
tions, resisting the use of military force.
The Russians support China over Taiwan and
are equally against the use of human rights ques-
tions as a means to apply pressure. Russian policy
has rejected such attempts, stating that this is med-
dling in internal affairs. China in turn backs Russia
over the expansion of NATO and with respect to
Chechnia sees this as an internal problem. Such joint
views are co-ordinated by foreign policies, which
help each side to show how it can in fact act, cer-
tainly more powerfully if not alone. It can easily be
hypothesised that Russian politics, which does not
have a great choice of partners, will continue carry-
ing out this policy, seeing in China a strategic part-
ner likely to be content with it.
In relations with west European countries,
some circles in the Russian political elite still count
on differences, divisions and national interests that
are not the same in the West and can lead to differ-
ences of viewpoints. This particularly relates to the
views of the Europeans as against those of the US.
Carrying out a policy that did have its place in the
previous phase of international relations, Russia is
attempting to find common points of contact, espe-
cially in relations with Germany and France, so as to
create fissures in the Atlantic alliance and make pos-
sible the softening of certain views relating to Rus-
sia and Russian politics.
Irrespective of the traditions of relationships,
and similarities of views in certain questions, it is
nevertheless difficult to imagine that Russian poli-
tics could lead to any serious divisions in the Atlan-
tic community. The bases of the association are so
firm and so enduring that Russia could not obtain
any serious successes through any sort of manipula-
tion. Apart from this, the Russian side is so weak-
ened that it could offer nothing big even if any of the
western countries should wish to play on the Rus-
sian card. And if it is a matter of views about rela-
tions in the world order, the Europeans, however
much they might be satisfied or dissatisfied with the
present situation, still know that the US, the central
pole, is their long-term ally and that, on the other
hand, through Atlantic forms of collaboration, they
are participating at the summit of the world order.
This is certainly much more practical and attractive
than anything that Russian might be able to offer.
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Challengers from outside
the circle of great powers
If one were looking for countries that are not
over-satisfied with the existing world order and think
that it ought to be different one might start from sev-
eral kinds of criticism:
- some countries think that the current order is too con-
centrated around the central pole and leaves too little
space for the actions of other players,
- there is also criticism that with the top of the world
order organised in this way, too little attention is paid
to crucial questions of world survival and development
(hunger, the less developed, ecology in less developed
countries and so on),
- relations structured in this way are not a guarantee
for the rapid surmounting of the gap between devel-
oped and undeveloped, and that this great group of
countries is actually left to one side by the main politi-
cal, economic and social currents of contemporary de-
velopment,
- most world questions continue to be solved in a nar-
row, narrower even than in the time of the cold war,
circle, with a tendency to ignore, marginalise even, the
UN.
All these criticisms, to which many others could
doubtlessly be added, clearly show that the world or-
der, even today, after the cold war, is incapable of cre-
ating a unified system of relationships taking account
of all states. The emphasis on the central pole and the
four parts of the top of the system cannot satisfy nu-
merous other states or help in the solution of the prob-
lems of complex contemporary development. At the
same time, in these criticisms there are the roots of the
views of certain countries, formed in their strategic
political conceptions and afterwards projected within
relationships at a regional or global level.
Where relatively large and powerful countries
are concerned, these criticisms are more important be-
cause they do not only show the level of dissatisfac-
tion, but also the possible line of development for fur-
ther action, which can sometimes have serious conse-
quences in a security framework.
The current world order is still based on the line
of division that exists between developed and unde-
veloped countries, or, as it is sometimes defmed, be-
tween the zone of peace and the zone of instability.
And since in the peace zone there is only 15% of the
population of the planet, it is easy to conclude that in
the great area of instability there are no conditions for
relatively rapid transition to the zone of peace and pros-
perity.
As well as this great divide, which splits two
worlds or zones, those of the rich and the poor, since
the fall of European socialism and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, there have been more and more phases
in circulation about Islam as a danger and the greatest
challenge to the current order. The very phrase new
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world order was used during preparations for the at-
tack on Iraq, which in a sense was a strike against a
certain kind of radical Islam.
In a wider sense, the Islamic threat is seen as a
group of dangers connected with nuclear weapons, ter-
rorism, and the great wave of migrants from Islamic
countries. With these definitions, it is clear that radi-
cal Islam, or the Islamic threat can show up in various
places and that it might be possible to talk of some
kind of global challenge.
In one interpretation, there is a great Islamic arc
from Mauritania to the Korean borders while in the
other variant some countries only are taken as dangers,
such as Libya, Iraq, Pakistan or perhaps Iran. Apart
from this, among Islamic countries, it is possible to
find a few that are exposed to sanctions and embar-
goes, and it is logical that they should not accept the
world order as something that can ensure them an equal
place in international life.
Looked at within the idea of the conflict of
civilisations and the new creation of a world order, Is-
lam is taken, by Huntington for example, as a constant
challenger, and as a power which is in conflict with
the west. This conflict is intensifying, and of the large
number of Islamic countries, only a few of them have
come at all close to constructing state communities in
western forms. Opposing the thesis that for the West
the main danger is Islamic fundamentalism, Hunting-
ton says that it is not a question only of radical Islam
but of Islam as a civilisation the members of which
consider their values to be higher and thus act hos-
tilely to western civilisation. Adding to this a still wider
formulation about a conflict running along the line of
the "rest against the West" Huntington actually locates
the whole of the world order in the developed West,
expecting challenges and conflicts from the rest of the
world which will apparently work for the overthrow
of this world order.
In the Islamic countries, especially in Iran, they
resolutely reject such analyses about the conflict of
civilisation and the place of Islam. It is said that the
whole conception about Islam as a danger was launched
in 1990 when the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
socialist system began, and when it was necessary to
find another enemy. In this framework, Islam, irre-
spective of its real qualities, the differences among the
variants of the Islamic religion and particularly the dif-
ferences among Islamic states has been pronounced a
single danger so that attention should be directed in
that attention. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was an
excellent excuse, and the creation of new Asiatic states
in the ex-USSR gave credence to the thesis of the threat
from the south.
In Iran it is said that the whole stability of the
West depends on the creation of some illusory enemy,
and that Islam, or rather the thesis about the inevitable
conflict of civilisations, has been used in this light.
Mechanically taking the fifty or so Islamic states and
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the numerousness of their populations, it was relatively
easy to launch an image of adversaries with religious
and cultural, ideological and military contours.
In Iran in the last few years they have insistently
stated that there is no inevitable conflict of civilisations
and that this is a distorted thesis that simplifies histori-
cal experience and does not take account of the present,
and still less of the future. The contemporary world is
polycentric and there is enough room in it for the col-
laboration of civilisations, for their promotion and
complementation, and not for struggle and possible
elimination.
The idea about a new world order is looked at
as a typical example of neo-colonialism in which one
super power has announced its desire to work actively
and independently world-wide. Using the example of
American-Iranian relations, that is of embargoes, sanc-
tions and pressures on other countries not to have rela-
tions with Iran, Iranian politics wants to show that the
new world order is there to serve American interests
and the Americans' conviction that they are the mas-
ters of the world.
In some wider strategic visions of the future as
well as Islam, as a danger to the world order, the possi-
bility has been seen of the creation of alliances of dis-
satisfied countries, which in a different light might be
powerful challengers. The triangle, so called, of Iran,
Russia and China, constituted by countries that for
various reasons are not satisfied with the current ar-
rangements, which consider that they do not have an
appropriate place at the top, or which would like radi-
cal changes, might combine out of sheer dissatisfac-
tion. That would be the common denominator that
would help to bring together all the economic, military
and political forces, and get these countries to work
together. But in reality however much this triangle
might seem attractive to some, it should not be forgot-
ten that there are after all enormous differences in the
traditions, values and interests of these countries. Each
of them is occupied with its own problems which will
certainly outweigh any possible desire for co-opera-
tion and it is a question whether such triangular co-
operation, antagonising other players, might not bring
more losses than gains.
In spite of all changes that are coming, or that
will come, in ten or twenty years, the most modem
technology nevertheless comes from America and the
West, and it is difficult to anticipate the creation of any
modem developed leagues from countries that are
highly dependent on the West. Apart from this, the
power of all three countries, in spite of their popula-
tion and great resources, is not at the level for them to
be able to close themselves off in this triangle and de-
velop relations that they would later be able to impose
on others. Only in international co-operation does
Russia have a chance of solving its enormous prob-
lems; China can keep up the rapid tempo of its devel-
opment and move slowly towards improving living
•
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conditions only by strengthening its relations with the
world, while Iran, in spite of its isolation and imposed
enclosedness, will be able to see prosperity only the
day it starts to develop wider forms of international
co-operation.
Co-operation is the imperative of contemporary
international relations, and international relations have
never in their history been so open to the development
of the most diverse forms of relationships among states.
It is in this strengthening of co-operation, the interweav-
ing of ties and relations, the mingling of civilisations,
values and national interests that the possibility of cre-
ating a new world order lies, one that will suit, if not all,
at least most members ofthe world community.
An analysis of the current stage of the world
order in contemporary conditions would show that:
- it is still dominated by one super power and its at-
tempts to remain a super power as long as possible,
- the international conditions have not yet been cre-
ated for a group of states to be formed around the cen-
tral pole, representing a kind of caucus of the biggest
and most powerful states,
- the international organisation of the UN is fairly far
away from being able to become the real centre of the
world order,
- there is an obvious dissatisfaction on the part of some
states that for various reasons consider a world order
of this kind does not suit them, most international rela-
tionships, in spite of attempts to introduce the term
multipolarity, taking place unilaterally,
- the new world order is not capable of solving the
central problems of the survival and development of
the world, and is not capable of eliminating all con-
flicts,
- challengers of the new world order for the moment
can be against various solutions, they can use their vote
in the UN but because of their weakness they are not
able to make a serious threat to the substance and di-
rection of contemporary international relations.
The relatively short period since the end of the
cold war has not been enough, of course, to build one
model of the world order to suit everyone. The world is
multipolar in terms offorms and players, and yet in terms
of some central decisions unilateral. It is in this conflict
of multipolarity and unilateralness that the greatest chal-
lenge to the world order actually lies. Only the creation
of a greater number of poles that will be powerful,
organised and determined to run an active foreign policy
will be able to create the foundations of the multipolar
order which will pay more attention to all members of
the international community. It should also be said that
the creation of alliances would not be useful, and might
lead to some new kind of confrontation.
If the world overcame the phase of cold war
confrontation, in spite of all its imperfections and in-
completeness, then the new world order can be taken
as the first step towards a multipolar and democratic
system of the future. •
